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A NEW ERA IN THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE-A PRIMER ON EVALUATING THE WEIGHT
OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE*
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED**
Modernly, scientific proof is one of the chief types of evidence in
criminal cases.' In a recent survey of judges and attorneys by the
National Center for State Courts, forty-four percent of those re-
sponding stated that they encountered scientific evidence in at
least thirty percent of their cases.2 There are numerous scientific
evidence texts tailored for criminal practitioners, and virtually
every seminar on criminal practice includes a presentation on sci-
entific proof.3 In the words of one experienced prosecutor, scien-
tific proof has become "the backbone of every circumstantial evi-
dence case."4
To appreciate how scientific evidence gained this critical role, we
must review the stages in the evolution of scientific evidence. Gen-
eralization about legal development is always dangerous, but we
can discern three different eras in the modern history of scientific
evidence.
At the beginning of the 1960's, scientific evidence was relatively
unimportant. Prosecutors relied primarily on physical evidence
and lay testimony, especially the testimony of eyewitnesses. For
their part, defense counsel responded in kind. However, in that
same decade the Warren Court began fashioning the fourth,5 fifth,6
* This article is based in part on the editorial commentary the author prepared for
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE (E. Imwinkelried ed. 1981), recently published by the
Practicing Law Institute of New York.
** Professor of Law, Washington University; B.A., 1967; J.D., 1969, University of San
Francisco.
1. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1198-1200 (1980).
2. National Center for State Courts Report, Study to Investigate Use of Scientific Evi-
dence, vol. 7, No. 8 (Aug. 1980).
3. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports
Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 622 (1979).
4. Clark, Scientific Evidence, in THE PROSEcuToR's DESKBOOK 542 (1971).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and sixth1 amendment exclusionary rules. Those rules restricted
the admissibility of the physical evidence and lay testimony that
the prosecution had relied so heavily upon.'
In the minds of many police and prosecutors, the Warren Court
decisions created an "evidence void."" Police agencies developed a
new approach to investigation and placed much greater emphasis
on forensic techniques.10 Similarly, prosecutors felt compelled to
resort to scientific evidence much more frequently than they had
in the past.11 Although many defense counsel would deny that the
Warren Court precedents drastically limited prosecution use of
confessions or physical evidence, it is clear that prosecutors held
that perception. Whether or not that perception was correct, the
perception motivated prosecutors to employ scientific evidence
much more often.
Predictably, the number of cases involving scientific evidence in-
creased dramatically during the 1970's. During the 1970's, the
courts were overwhelmed with such strange forensic techniques as
atomic absorption (AA),12 forward looking infrared (FLIR),23 neu-
tron activation analysis (NAA), 4 nuclear magnetic resonance
(NMR),15 and scanning electron microscopy (SEM).1" As the prose-
cutors offered these novel types of scientific evidence, they forced
the courts to learn a whole new vocabulary.
The defense bar countered by resurrecting the Frye test to block
the admission of the prosecution's scientific proof.1" Frye had been
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
8. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1199-1200.
9. Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK 547 (1971).
10. Osterburg, Forensic Science and the United States Supreme Court: The Impact and
Significance of Past Decisions, in LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 3, 9-10 (C. Wecht ed. 1972).
11. Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
12. State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35, 383 A.2d 440 (1978); State v. Crowder, 285 N.C.
42, 203 S.E.2d 38 (1974), modified on other grounds, 428 U.S. 903 (1976).
13. United States v. Kilgus, 471 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
14. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368
(Mo. 1972).
15. Bailey & Legault, The Use of Carbon-13 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectra in the
Identification and Authentication of Monomethoxyamphetamines and Dimethoxy-
amphetamines, 26 J. FOR. ScI. 27 (1981).
16. People v. Palmer, 80 Cal. App. 3d 239, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1978).
17. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
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decided a half century earlier in the 1920's.11 In Frye, the appellate
court sustained the trial judge's ruling excluding a forerunner of
the polygraph, systolic blood pressure evidence. 9 Frye is a
landmark because it announced a special, rigorous standard for the
admission of scientific evidence.20 Frye excluded the systolic blood
pressure evidence because the theory had not gained "general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. '21 Under Frye,
it is not enough that the prosecutor can find one qualified expert
to vouch for the new scientific technique.22 The prosecutor has to
meet a much more stringent test; the prosecutor must establish
that as a matter of historical fact, the theory has gained general
acceptance within the relevant scientific circle.23
During the 1970's, Frye proved to be a formidable barrier to the
introduction of prosecution scientific evidence. For example, in a
single year, 1977, the courts invoked Frye as the basis for exclud-
ing evidence of ion microprobe analysis, 24 trace metal detection
technique,25 and Decatur Ragun.26 The courts also relied upon
Frye as the ground for banning evidence of forward looking infra-
red27 and hypnotic memory enhancement.28 In short, the decade of
the 1970's was dominated by the threshold question of the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence. Defense counsel invoked Frye so suc-
cessfully that the commentators almost unanimously deplored the
fact that Frye banned many promising forensic techniques from
the courtroom. 29
The thesis of this article is that we are now entering a new stage
in the evolution of scientific evidence-a stage that will be domi-
nated by questions of the weight of scientific evidence rather than
18. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. Id.
20. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1204-08.
21. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
22. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1204-08.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977).
25. People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
26. State v. Boyington, 153 N.J. Super. 252, 379 A.2d 486 (App. Div. 1977).
27. United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978).
28. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
29. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 489-90 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972); Moenssens, Polygraph Test Results Meet Standards for Admissibility as Evidence,
in LEGAL ADMISSIILrrY OF THE POLYGRAPH 19 (N. Ansley ed. 1975).
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admissibility. Part I of this article collects the data pointing to
that conclusion. Part I notes that there is an emerging trend to-
ward the liberalization of the standards for admitting scientific evi-
dence. Part II of this article comes to grips with the import of that
trend. If the courts are going to admit scientific evidence more lib-
erally, we must learn to critically evaluate the weight of scientific
evidence. Part II proposes an analytic approach to the weight of
scientific proof.
I. A NEW ERA IN THE EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE-THE
NECESSITY FOR LEARNING HOW TO EVALUATE THE WEIGHT OF
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
This modern era in the evolution of scientific evidence is para-
doxical. Two seemingly inconsistent developments are occurring si-
multaneously. On the one hand, as previously noted, several juris-
dictions have begun to relax the admissibility standards for
scientific evidence. On the other hand, the relaxation is taking
place at the very time that we are coming to a new, alarming reali-
zation of the incidence of error in forensic analysis.
The apparent contradiction is that this realization of the possi-
bility of error in forensic analysis is dawning on us at the very time
that many jurisdictions are beginning to liberalize the standards
for admitting forensic proof. As we previously stated, Frye is the
leading American authority on the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence.30 Until very recently, Frye was the almost universal view
among American courts. The overwhelming weight of authority in
both federal and state courts accepted Frye,3 1 and it seemed to be
the well-settled standard in at least forty-five states.2
Although the courts seemed satisfied with the prevailing Frye
test, the commentators have been less than enthusiastic about
Frye. Indeed, almost from its inception, Frye has been subjected to
a drumbeat of criticism. First, the commentators claim that the
courts have been unpredictable and selective in characterizing
30. Gianneli, supra note 1, at 1204.
31. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875, 878-79
(1979); 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 757, 763 (1979).
32. Id.
[Vol. 23:261264
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proof as "scientific" evidence that must pass muster under Frye.33
Next, they charge that it is often difficult to identify the relevant
scientific field.3 4 Should forensic science itself be treated as a scien-
tific field? 5 Third, the critics allege that the test's use of the ex-
pression, "general acceptance," renders the test ambiguous.36 The
courts have never succeeded in quantifying the standard for gen-
eral acceptance. 37 Finally and most importantly, the commentators
damn Frye because the test results in the exclusion of much valua-
ble, reliable scientific evidence.3 8 The test ensures that the courts
will constantly lag behind the advances of science while the courts
wait for novel scientific techniques to win "general acceptance." By
banning these techniques from the courtroom, Frye frustrates the
search for truth. 9
These criticisms are having a telling impact on Frye. Notwith-
standing the growing evidence of a substantial margin of error in
forensic analysis, a number of jurisdictions have recently repudi-
ated Frye and liberalized the standards for admitting scientific evi-
dence.40 These jurisdictions have rationalized the liberalization on
three theories.
Frye, of course, is a case law rule and has a common law origin.
Some jurisdictions have abandoned Frye as a rule of decisional
law. The first slippage away from Frye occurred in 1969 in Cop-
polino v. State, a Florida decision.41 The Florida court stressed
that the trial judge has wide discretion in deciding whether to ad-
mit novel scientific evidence. 42 During the 1970's, other jurisdic-
tions largely ignored Coppolino. A full decade passed before an-
other court, a New York Supreme Court, was daring enough to
33. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1219-21.
34. Id. at 1208-10.
35. Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFFALO L. REv. 393, 394 (1964).
36. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1215-19.
37. Id. at 1216.
38. Id. at 1223-24.
39. United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
40. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1228-31; Lipton, The Results of Scientific Techniques as
Evidence in Federal Courts: Evolution of the Frye v. United States Standard in the Period
1969-77, 8 ENVRONMENTAL L. 769 (1978).
41. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).
42. Id. at 70, 75; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1234-35 ("Coppolino thus ignores rather than
rejects Frye.").
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overrule Frye.43 In mid-1980, in a case of first impression involving
Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) blood test evidence, the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that it would no longer treat general ac-
ceptance as an absolute requirement for the introduction of scien-
tific evidence. 4" The court reduced general acceptance to the status
of a factor in a discretionary determination of whether the new
forensic technique is trustworthy.45 In late 1980, the Iowa Supreme
Court joined the ranks of the courts rejecting Frye.46 The court
echoed all the criticisms of Frye and announced that "we do not
believe that 'general scientific acceptance' is a prerequisite to the
admission of [scientific] evidence . . if the reliability of the evi-
dence is otherwise established.' '47
While some courts have used their common law powers to jetti-
son Frye, other jurisdictions have taken a second, statutory tack.
On July 1, 1975, the new Federal Rules of Evidence became effec-
tive.48 Twenty-two jurisdictions have already adopted a version of
the Rules,49 and more may follow suit soon.50 It is arguable that
the Rules impliedly abolish Frye. Federal Rule 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority.5 1
This provision precludes trial judges from inventing new, deci-
sional rules excluding relevant evidence. Frye is a decisional rule,
and the Rules nowhere codify Frye. Hence, there is a strong statu-
tory construction argument that the Rules impliedly overrule
Frye.52 Three jurisdictions-New Mexico,5" Maine," and the Court
43. People v. Daniels, 102 Misc. 2d 540, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
44. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
45. Id. at 1234.
46. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980).
47. Id. at 85.
48. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as FED. R. Evm. 1101-
1103).
49. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1228-29 & n.241.
50. Id.
51. FED. R. EVID. 402.
52. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1228-31. However, it should be noted that the legislative
history of the Rules does not even faintly suggest that either Congress or the Advisory Com-
mittee intended to overrule Frye. 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 757, 763 n.53 (1979). Further, since the
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit 55 -have drawn that conclusion.
Lastly, other courts have invalidated Frye on constitutional
grounds. In two cases, a straightforward due process argument met
with success. In 1975, a New Mexico court accorded the defendant
a due process right to introduce polygraph evidence, 58 and in 1979
a federal district court reached the same result.57 There is signifi-
cant scholarly sentiment favoring this due process rationale.58
There is another constitutional theory for admitting scientific evi-
dence: the compulsory process guarantee. 59 In Washington v.
Texase° and Chambers v. Mississippi,61 the Supreme Court found
an implied right to present critical, reliable defense evidence in the
express compulsory process provision. It was perhaps expectable
that some court would eventually employ this sixth amendment ra-
tionale to override Frye and reverse a trial judge's exclusion of de-
fense polygraph evidence. An Ohio trial court did precisely that. 2
This decision gave a new constitutional impetus to the decline of
the Frye test.
Concurrent with the decline of the Frye test was the growth of
the realization that scientific proof is far from infallible. In the
early 1970's, there were revelations of significant margins of error
in toxicological analysis.6 8 There were indications, for example, of a
substantial degree of error in blood alcohol analysis by both
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most of the courts of appeals that have ad-
dressed the issue have continued to apply Frye. 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875, 878-79 (1979).
53. Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the New Mexico and Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 6 NEw MEx. L. REv. 187 (1976).
54. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
55. United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978); see 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 757, 769
(1979).
56. State v. Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d
204 (1975).
57. Jackson v. Garrison, 495 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.N.C. 1979).
58. See, e.g., 12 CONN. L. Rnv. 324 (1980); 55 IND. L.J. 157 (1979).
59. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
60. Id.
61. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also Imwinkelried, Constitutional and Statutory Theories
for the Admissibility of Defense Evidence, in SEvENTEENTH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMINAL
CASEs 419, 438-47 (1979).
62. State v. Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1977).
63. Niyogi, Toxicology, in ScImErFC AND ExPERT EVIDENCE 343, 383-84 (2d ed. E. Im-
winkelried 1981).
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clinical and public health laboratories." In the mid-1970's, Dinovo
and Gottschalk reported significant interlaboratory variation in the
quality of drug analysis. 5
These studies prompted the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration to sponsor a much broader and more systematic test
of the proficiency of American crime laboratores. The LEAA's
Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program began in fall 1974. Be-
tween 235 and 240 crime laboratories from throughout the United
States participated in the program.6 To gauge the quality of anal-
ysis by these laboratories, a Project Advisory Committee prepared
samples and sent them to the participating laboratories for analy-
sis. The Committee knew the findings that a competent scientific
analysis of the samples would yield. The Committee then judged
the participating laboratories' reports against the known data.
It is an understatement to say that the findings of the Test Pro-
gram are alarming.8 7 "Shocking" would be more precise. Below is a
columnar analysis of the various tests and the percentage of "unac-
ceptable" (inaccurate or incomplete responses).,8 On some of these
tests, fewer than half the laboratories reached the correct
conclusion: 9
64. Center for Disease Control, Public Health Service, Report on Toxic Volatiles Survey
Nos. 1-3 (1971-72).
65. Dinovo & Gottschalk, Results of a Nine-Laboratory Survey of Forensic Toxicology
Proficiency, 22 CLNICAL CHEMISTRY 843-46 (1976).
66. Project Advisory Committee, Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program, Supplemen-
tary Report-samples 1-5, 6-10 at i (1975-76).
67. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 636-37.
68. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Newsletter (Sept. 1978).
69. See chart accompanying footnote 68 supra.
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Number "unacceptable" injuries x
Number of laboratories responding with data
100=Percent "Unacceptable"
% of
Number of Laboratories
Labs Number of Submitting
Sample Sample Responding "Unacceptable" "Unacceptable"
Number Type With Data Responses Responses
1 Drugs ............................ 205
2 Firearms ......................... 124
3 Blood ............................ 158
4 Glass .................... ....... 129
5 Paint ............................ 121
6 Drugs ............................ 181
7 Firearms ......................... 132
8 Blood ............................ 132
9 Glass ............................ 112
10 Paint ............................ 111
11 Soil .............. ............... 93
12 Fibers ............................ 120
13 Physiological Fluids
(A&B) ......................... 129
14 Arson ...... ..................... 118
15 Drugs ............................ 143
16 Paint ............................ 103
17 M etal ............................ 68
18 Hair
(A, B, C, D, & E) ............... 90
19 W ood ............................ 65
20 Questioned Documents
(A&B) ......................... 74
21 Firearms ......................... 88
16
35
6
6
24
3
7
94
35
57
53
2
(A) 3
(B) 2
34
26
35
15
(A) 2.3
(B) 1.6
28.8
18.2
34.0
22.1
DOG (A) 50.0
CAT (B) 27.6
DEER (C) 54.4
COW (D) 67.8
MINK (E) 55.6
21.5
(A) 5.4
(B) 18.9
13.6
The LEAA project director, Mr. John 0. Sullivan, declared that
the Testing Program demonstrates that "[t]he laboratories are
having difficulties in identifying the samples."70 The program un-
questionably documented "a very real possibility of error in the
forensic analyses conducted by police laboratories in the United
States. '71
This first development, the relaxed admissibility standards for
70. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Newsletter 5 (Sept. 1978).
71. Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 637.
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scientific evidence, makes it probable that defense counsel will be
confronting more and more scientific evidence in the future.: The
pace of technological advance certainly has not slowed;7 2 and the
common-law, statutory, and constitutional theories for overriding
Frye should accelerate the rate at which forensic advances surface
in the courtroom. Frye will no longer be the substantial barrier it
was during the mid-1970's, and the opponent of the scientific evi-
dence will have to resort more frequently to weight attacks.
The second development, the startling revelation of the inci-
dence of error in forensic analysis, suggests that if properly pre-
pared and presented, weight attacks can be successful. The trial
judge may admit the proponent's scientific evidence, but the oppo-
nent may be able to persuade the trier of fact to attach little
weight to the evidence. If the error levels disclosed in the Labora-
tory Proficiency Testing Program are at all typical of the error
levels in most crime laboratories, weight attacks on the scientific
evidence hold great promise.
To put the matter simply, the first development ensures that the
opponent of scientific evidence will have more opportunities to at-
tack the weight of the evidence; and the second development sup-
plies the motivation to mount the weight attacks. The 1980's will
witness a new epoch in the evolution of scientific evidence, and the
hallmark of the new epoch will be a shift in focus from admissibil-
ity attacks to weight attacks.
As a case in point, consider the recent history of HLA evi-
dence. 73 A few years ago most criminal practitioners had not even
heard of HLA evidence; the technique did not become widely
known until the late 1970's. It was immediately apparent that
HLA blood evidence has greater discriminatory power7 4 than the
more traditional red cell systems such as ABO.75 The courts were
so impressed with HLA that they readily accepted the evidence7 6
72. Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980).
73. See Eliman & Kaye; Probabilities and Proof: Can HLA and Blood Groups Testing
Prove Paternity?, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1131 (1979).
74. Id. at 1137-43.
75. Id.
76. Seven states have held HLA test results admissible: California: e.g., County of Fresno
v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. App. 3d 133, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1979); Cramer v. Morrison, 88
Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); Florida: Carlyon v. Weeks, 387 So. 2d 465 (Fla.
[Vol. 23:261
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and brushed aside Frye objections to HLA.77 The admissibility of
HLA evidence was established very rapidly,7 8 and the struggle over
HLA evidence quickly shifted from admissibility analysis to weight
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Illinois: Miller v. Smith, No. 79-MI-185098 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 27, 1980);
Ohio: Pollard v. Sell, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2548 (Ohio Ct. App. May 21, 1981); New Jersey:
Camden County Bd. of Social Servs. v. Kellner, No. DR-466-76 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. ReL Ct.
Jan. 28, 1980); Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279 (1979); New York: e.g.,
Commissioner of Social Servs. v. Lardeo, 100 Misc. 2d 220, 417 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Far. Ct.
1979); Goodrich v. Norman, 100 Misc. 2d 33, 421 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Farn. Ct. 1979); Washing-
ton: State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980).
Four states that have refused to admit HLA test results have recognized the efficacy of
HLA. They rejected admissibility on grounds other than reliability. Massachusetts: Com-
monwealth v. Blazo, - Mass. -, 406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980) (trial judge had discretion to
exclude evidence); Michigan: Cardenas v. Chavez, 7 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2423 (Mich. Ct.
App. Dec. 18, 1980); Utah: Phillips ex rel. Utah State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615
P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (proponents of evidence had not laid proper foundation for admis-
sion of evidence); Wisconsin: J.B. v. A.F., 92 Wis. 2d 696, 285 N.W.2d 880 (Ct. App. 1979)
(nonexclusionary evidence inadmissible under statute).
Moreover, four states recently amended their blood test statutes to authorize the admis-
sion of HLA evidence. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-306 (1981) provides:
As soon as practicable after an action has been brought the court upon mo-
tion of the plaintiff, the defendant, or any other interested party, may order
the mother, the alleged father, and the child to submit to any blood tests, in-
cluding human leukocyte antigen (HLA) testing if available, which have been
developed or established for purposes of disproving or proving parentage and
which are reasonably accessible. If the court orders such blood tests and if the
action is brought prior to the birth of the child, the court shall order the blood
tests made as soon as medically feasible after the birth. The tests shall be per-
formed by a duly qualified licensed practicing physician, duly qualified immu-
nologist, or other qualified person. The court may, upon motion by a party,
order that independent tests be performed by other experts qualified as exam-
iners of blood types. In all cases, however, the court shall determine the num-
ber and qualifications of the experts. An order issued under this subsection is
enforceable by contempt; except that if the petitioner refuses to submit to an
order for a blood test, the court upon motion of the defendant may dismiss the
suit. (emphasis added)
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-6.1-8 (Burns 1980) provides:
Upon the motion of any party, the court shall order all of the parties to the
action to undergo either a blood grouping test or a Human Leukocyte Antigen
(HLA) tissue test. The tests shall be performed by a qualified expert approved
by the court, and the results of the tests may be received in evidence. (empha-
sis added)
Wisc. STAT. § 767.48 was also amended to authorize generally the admission of evidence of
"genetic markers," and the New York Family Court Act was reworded to sanction the intro-
duction of "the results of the human leucocyte antigen blood tissue test." See In re Jane L.,
7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2474 (N.Y. Fam. Ct., N.Y. County May 12, 1981).
77. Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979).
78. Id.
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analysis.79 The burning dispute over HLA evidence is now the ex-
tent to which the proponent will be permitted to quantify the
weight of the evidence by citing a percent probability of paternity
to the jury.80 The court's treatment of HLA augurs the way in
which the courts will probably deal with novel scientific evidence
in the 1980's: If the reliability of the evidence is demonstrable, the
courts will waste little time in ruling the evidence admissible; and
the real debate over the evidence in this decade will be the resolu-
tion of the probative weight of the evidence.
II. AN APPROACH TO EVALUATING THE WEIGHT OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
In the past, attorneys have been rather reluctant to attack the
weight of scientific evidence offered against them. Until very re-
cently, in drug cases most defense attorneys routinely stipulated to
the results of the police laboratory analysis of the suspected
drugs.8 ' At first, defense attorneys were also hesitant to attack
sound spectrography evidence. One court noted that in eighty per-
cent of the previous cases admitting sound spectrography evidence,
the defense had not presented any expert testimony disputing the
reliability of the voiceprint technique.8 2
This hesitancy is understandable. The heavy emphasis on
threshold admissibility questions in the reported cases certainly
contributed to the neglect of weight issues. Moreover, most attor-
neys receive little or no law school training in evaluating the
weight of evidence, including scientific evidence. Most evidence
courses and texts concentrate on the admissibility of evidence, 83 its
legal sufficiency to sustain various burdens, 4 and substitutes for
evidence. 85 The courses and texts completely overlook weight anal-
ysis. Trial techniques courses and texts are almost as neglectful. In
79. Ellman & Kaye, supra note 73, at 1143-61.
80. Id.
81. TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 5 (Winter 1978).
82. People v. Chapter, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2479 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1973).
83. See, e.g., E. IMWINKELRIED, P. GIANNELLI, F. GILLIGAN & F. LEDERER, CRIMINAL EvI-
DENCE chs. 1-26 (1979) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL EVIDENCE]; C. MCCORMICK, supra note
29, Chs. 1-34.
84. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 83, ch. 27; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, ch. 36.
85. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 83, ch. 28; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 29, ch. 35.
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large part, the typical trial techniques text simply teaches the evi-
dentiary admissibility standards in a more practical fashion.86 The
text will devote some coverage to attacking the weight of opposing
evidence, but the evidence in question is usually the opposition's
lay testimony.87
Moreover, attorneys tend to feel more comfortable working with
the Frye admissibility test than they do evaluating the weight of
scientific evidence. Frye is an essentially historical test: As a mat-
ter of historical fact, has this forensic technique gained general ac-
ceptance within the relevant scientific circle? Attorneys constantly
litigate historical issues, and they feel at ease litigating the ques-
tion presented by the Frye test precisely because it is an historical
issue rather than a scientific issue. An attorney can successfully
litigate the application of the Frye test to a scientific technique
even if the attorney knows very little about the technical aspects of
the technique. However, when the focus shifts from admissibility
to weight, the attorney needs a much more sophisticated under-
standing of the forensic technique.
Most of the published texts on scientific evidence reinforce the
attorney's reluctance to evaluate the weight of scientific proof. The
typical text is a catalogue of scientific techniques; the text lists one
technique after another and presents a good deal of technical de-
tail about each technique. 88 These texts do not even attempt to
synthesize the voluminous material and do not offer the attorney
an overall approach to evaluating the probative weight of the myr-
iad techniques mentioned in the texts. The attorney naturally is
intimidated by the bewildering array of scientific techniques and
data.
The purpose of Part II of this article is to outline an approach to
the evaluation of the weight of scientific evidence. This approach
groups forensic techniques into three broad categories: (1) instru-
mental techniques that yield numerical test results; (2) techniques
that yield non-numerical, visual displays; and (3) "software" tech-
86. See, e.g., J. MCELHANEY, EFFECTIVE LITIGATION (1974).
87. Id. at chs. III & V. Chapter V, devoted to expert witnesses, deals primarily with the
admissibility of expert testimony.
88. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAu, SciENTIFIc EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (2d ed. 1978); J.
RICHARDSON, MODERN SCmENTIc EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1974); ScImNTIic AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL ADVOCACY (J. Cederbaums & S. Arnold eds. 1975).
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niques. We shall now review each category, list some of the tech-
niques falling within the category, and identify the pivotal ques-
tions that must be asked to properly evaluate the probative weight
of the technique.
A. The First Category: Instrumental Techniques that Yield a
Numerical Result
In the minds of most lay jurors, these techniques epitomize sci-
entific evidence. Laypersons ordinarily assume that truly pre-
cise-and, hence, "scientific"-test results can be couched in nu-
merical terms. They are most impressed by sophisticated
instrumentation capable of exact, minute measurement. There are
numerous illustrations of this type of technique. One example is
the gas chromatograph (GCI) used to detect tiny quantities of al-
cohol vapor in breath samples. 89 Another illustrative technique is
neutron activation analysis (NAA). 90 One of the primary advan-
tages of this technique is its tremendous sensitivity.91 NAA can
measure quantities 1,000 times smaller than prior techniques. 92 Al-
though its sensitivity varies with the element being analyzed, the
chart below shows NAA's fantastic capability for measuring min-
ute samples:93
89. Hutton, Cross-Examination of a Criminalist in a Gas Chromatograph Case, in SCIEN-
TIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 221 (2d ed. E. Imwinkelreid 1981).
90. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 88, ch. 9.
91. Watkins & Watkins, Identification of Substances by Neutron Activation Analysis, 15
AM. JUR. P.O.F. 115, 123-25 (1964).
92. Id. at 124.
93. Id.
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One hour irradiation at a thermal neutron flux of
2 x 10"1 n/cm' sec
Limit of Limit of Limit of
Measurement Measurement Measurement
Element (micrograms) Element (micrograms) Element (micrograms)
Aluminum 0.01 Indium 0.00005 Rhodium 0.0005
Antimony 0.005 Iodine 0.005 Rubidium 0.05
Argon 0.05 Iridium 0.0001 Ruthenium 0.01
Arsenic 0.001 Iron 200 Samarum 0.0005
Barium 0.05 Lanthanum 0.001 Scandium 0.01
Bismuth 0.5 Lead 10 Selenium 0.01
Bromine 0.005 Lithium 100 Silicon 0.05
Cadmium 0.05 Lutecium 0.00005 Silver 0.0001
Calcium 1 Magnesium 0.5 Sodium 0.005
Cerium 0.1 Manganese 0.00005 Strontium 0.005
Cesium 0.5 Mercury 0.01 Tantalum 0.05
Chlorine 0.01 Molybdenum 0.1 Tellurium 0.05
Chromium 1 Neodymium 0.1 Terbium 0.05
Cobalt 0.005 Nickel 0.05 Thallium 5
Copper 0.001 Niobium 0.005 Thonum 0.05
Dysprosium 0.000001 Osmium 0.05 Thulium 0.01
Erbium 0.001 Palladium 0.05 Tin 0.5
Europium 0.000005 Phosphorus 0.5 Titanium 0.05
Fluorine 1 Platinum 0.05 Tungsten 0.001
Gadolinium 0.01 Potassium 0.05 Uranium 0.005
Gallium 0.005 Praseodymium 0.0005 Vanadium 0.001
Germanium 0.005 Rhemum 0.0005 Ytterbium 0.001
Gold 0.0005 Zinc 0.1
Hafnium I Zirconium 1
Holmium 0.0001
Activation Analysis Sensitivies. The detection limits of many elements listed here can actually be
pushed 10 to 100 times further if needed.
This is obviously the sort of evidence that may awe the trier of
fact. Consider a simple hypothetical. An NAA expert takes the
stand and first describes the fantastic capabilities of the instru-
ment. The expert then testifies that she ran a comparative analysis
of the paint on defendant's car and a paint chip found at the crime
scene. The analysis revealed the "same" minute quantities of three
different chemical elements in the two samples. How can we evalu-
ate this evidence? How can we prevent the jury from leaping to the
conclusion that the paint chip necessarily came from the defen-
dant's car? To properly evaluate this type of evidence, we must ask
two questions.
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1. Are there any imprecisions in the formula the instrument
uses to compute the number?
There is such an imprecision in the case of the gas chro-
matograph. The GCI directly measures breath alcohol and then
employs a formula to convert the breath alcohol figure into a blood
alcohol concentration (BAC). 4 The GCI makes the conversion on
the assumption that there is the same amount of alcohol in one
part of the subject's blood as there is in 2,100 parts of the subject's
breath. 5 Is the 2,100 coefficient universally true? The answer is no.
Research indicates that the blood-breath coefficient varies from
person to person." The lower limit seems to be a coefficient of
1,500/1, and the upper limit seems to be a 3,000/1 coefficient. 7
Hence, the number generated by the GCI is not entitled to conclu-
sive weight on the question of the subject's blood alcohol
concentration. 8
There are other imprecisions in the formulae used in blood alco-
hol analysis. Assume arguendo that the GCI yielded the correct
BAC at the time of the GCI test. The test is usually administered
some time after the legally relevant event, that is, the assault or
traffic accident. To compute the BAC at the time of the legally
relevant event, the analyst must work backwards in time. To make
the retrospective computation, the analyst normally assumes that
the subject's clearance or elimination rate is 0.015% per hour. Is
that percent a constant? Again, the answer is no. The available
data indicates that the subject's clearance rate can range from
0.006% to 0.04%.100 Even if the BAC reading itself were absolutely
correct, the retrospective BAC is not entitled to determinative
weight.
94. Hutton, supra note 89, at 221.
95. Id.
96. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence Update, in SIXTEENTH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMI-
NAL CASES 707, 752 (citing research by Doctors Dubowski and Mason).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Radlow & Hurst, Delayed Blood Alcohol Determinations in Forensic Applications, 2
CRIM. JUST. J. 281 (1979).
100. Id. at 284.
[Vol. 23:261
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
2. Is there an adequate comparative data base to properly
evaluate the statistical significance of the number?
NAA does not suffer from the same weaknesses as the GC. Un-
less there is interference masking one of the elements in the sam-
ple, 101 NAA will give a true reading of the precise quantities of the
various elements present; the numbers will represent the correct
elemental composition of the sample being analyzed. But does that
mean that if the analyst finds the same quantities of elements in
the two paint samples, we must infer that the samples -came from
the same source? Or if NAA reveals the presence of antimony and
barium, the components of gunshot residue, must we conclude that
the subject recently fired a weapon? Common sense and sound sta-
tistical analysis supply the same answer: no.
In the past, some NAA experts have attempted to express such
conclusive opinions to lay jurors.102 But, upon reflection, it is clear
that in framing those opinions, the analysts were guilty of classic
non sequiturs. We cannot draw those inferences until we have de-
veloped a comparative data base.103 It may be true that there are
antimony and barium on the subject's hand and that they are the
components of primer. However, we must not leap to the conclu-
sion that the subject recently fired a weapon. First, we must ask: In
what quantities do antimony and barium naturally occur in the en-
vironment?0 4 What quantities of antimony and barium might an
innocent person collect on his or her hands through normal envi-
ronmental or occupational exposure?10 5 If the quantity of anti-
mony detected on the subject's hands is equal to or lower than the
"handblank" value, that is, the quantity he or she might pick up
through innocent exposure, the NAA finding does not dictate the
conclusion that the subject recently fired a weapon.106
The only way to determine whether we should draw the infer-
ence is to empirically investigate the environmental and occupa-
101. Imwinkelried, supra note 96, at 759-60.
102. State v. Spencer, 298 Minn. 456, 216 N.W.2d 131 (1974).
103. Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CAL. L. REV.
997, 1014 (1971).
104. Cowan & Purdon, Barium and Antimony Levels on Hand-Significance as Indicators
of Gunshot Residue, 15 J. RAnioANmALYxcA. CHEMsTRY 203 (1973).
105. State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35, 383 A.2d 440 (1978).
106. Id.
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tional incidence of those elements.'"° In response to statisticians'
critique of past NAA testimony, several law enforcement and re-
search laboratories undertook studies of handblank values.l08
These studies now enable us to draw much more confident infer-
ences from NAA of suspected gunshot residue. However, there are
other areas in which the data base is still undeveloped. For exam-
ple, there has been relatively little research on the application of
NAA to paint samples.109 The studies that have been conducted
have involved relatively small data bases,110 and the studies them-
selves caution against drawing inferences from their limited re-
search."' When an extensive data base is available, the NAA data
is entitled to considerable weight; but absent such a base, we
should be wary of attributing too much significance to the bare
numbers.
B. The Second Category: Techniques that Produce Visual
Displays
The techniques in the first category yield one type of visual dis-
play: a digital readout. There are other techniques that do not
yield numbers but nevertheless produce some sort of visual dis-
play. Among the most common examples are chemical color tests,
polygraphy, and sound spectrography. For example, the most com-
mon sort of drug identification test is a chemical color test.1 2 In
this test, the analyst adds a drop of known reagent to some of the
unknown drug, and the reaction produces a color-a color that
may be indicative of the identity of the unknown. 1"3 Similarly, in
107. Id.; Cowan & Purdon, supra note 104; Imwinkelried, supra note 96, at 760-61.
108. State v. Chatman, 156 N.J. Super. 35, 383 A.2d 440 (1978) mentions the handblank
studies conducted by the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
109. Gulf General Atomic, Application of Neutron Activation Analysis in Scientific Crime
Investigation: Forensic NAA of Paint (GA-10142) (155 paints); Snow & Washington, Com-
parison of Paints by Neutron Activation Analysis, 54 J. Ass'N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL CHEM-
isTs 917 (1971) (300 paints). The United States annually produces a billion gallons of
surface finish.
110. Id.
111. In Snow & Washington, supra note 109, the authors assert that "due to the limited
sample population, the results of this study cannot necessarily be extrapolated to all paints,
and probabilities of elemental'occurrence cannot be assuredly assigned." Id. at 919.
112. See, e.g., A. MOENSSENS & F. IMBAU, supra note 88, at 325-28.
113. Id.
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polygraphy, the end product is a polygram chart with numerous
markings to depict the subject's physiological reactions during the
questioning. 114 And in sound spectrography, the technique gener-
ates a spectrogram, which is a visual display of time and the voice's
pitch and amplitude." 5 Precisely because the display is non-nu-
merical, the interpretation of the display is a more subjective and
difficult task than interpreting the readout from an instrument in
the first category. Reading the number is a purely mechanical task
while evaluating a polygram or spectrogram requires more subtle
interpretation. To determine what weight to attach to the analyst's
evaluation, we must examine the validity and reliability of the ana-
lyst's interpretive standards.
Although laypersons and attorneys often use the expressions,
"validity" and "reliability," interchangeably, validity and reliabil-
ity are distinct concepts in forensic science." 6 "Validity" refers to
the technique's ability to measure what it is supposed to measure;
a technique's validity is its accuracy. 17 Sound spectrography is
designed to enable the analyst to determine whether the same
voice produced two spectrograms. The technique's validity de-
pends upon the percentage of cases in which the analyst correctly
makes the determination. In contrast, "reliability" refers to the
consistency of the technique."" Thus, a technique's reliability de-
pends upon the percentage of cases in which independent examin-
ers will draw the same inference from the test result. If two equally
competent polygraphists, one in New York and the other in Cali-
fornia, examine the same polygrams, how often will their diagnoses
of deception agree?" 9 To properly evaluate this category of foren-
sic technique, we must learn to assess the validity and reliability of
the analyst's interpretive standards.
1. How valid is the analyst's interpretive standard?
A technique is invalid to the extent that it produces false posi-
114. Id. at 609-15.
115. Id. at 571.
116. Abrams, Polygraphy, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 755, 791-99 (2d ed. E. Im-
winkelried 1981); Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1201 n.20.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Abrams, supra note 116, at 791-92.
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tives or false negatives. 2 ' A false positive is an incorrect identifica-
tion.12 Suppose that two different speakers produced the two spec-
trograms. The analyst's opinion would be a false positive if the
analyst concluded that the same person produced the spectro-
grams. A false negative is the converse: It is an incorrect elimina-
tion.122 Now assume that the same speaker produced both spectro-
grams. The analyst's opinion would be a false negative if the
analyst concluded that two different voices produced the
spectrograms.
The validity of a forensic technique can be assessed by quanti-
fying the expectable percentage of false positives and false nega-
tives. After doing so, we can determine the weight to be assigned to
the evidence because we know the risk of error. Thanks in large
part to the research of Dr. Oscar Tosi,125 we can define the risk of
error for at least some applications 124 of the sound spectrography
technique. Tosi conducted well-designed experiments to ascertain
the percentage of false positives and negatives in sound spec-
trography. 25 His research produced the finding that on the aver-
age, the false positive figure was six percent, but that if the exam-
iner is permitted to express no opinion when he or she thinks that
the question is too close, the false positive figure falls to two per-
cent.126 Tosi also concluded that on the average, the false negative
figure was thirteen percent, but that when the examiner had the
option of venturing no opinion, the false negative figure dropped to
five percent. 27 At this point, the question whether those error
rates are too high to admit voiceprint is irrelevant; we are focusing
now on weight rather than admissibility. The point is that Tosi's
120. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1201 n.20.
121. Comment, The Evidentiary Value of Spectrographic Voice Identification, 63 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE Sci. 343, 347-48 (1972).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) collects some of the literature criti-
cal of Tosi's study. The case notes several articles by Bolt and his colleagues. Bolt and his
colleagues pointed out that Tosi's experiments did not address such problems as mimicking
or disguising of voices, changes in voice levels, and changes due to stress or other emotional
states of the speaker.
125. Comment, supra note 121, at 347-48.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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research enables us to appraise the validity and deserved weight of
sound spectrography evidence.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we know that a forensic tech-
nique can yield false positives and negatives, but the available re-
search data does not permit us to quantify the margin of error. For
instance, we know that many of the chemical color tests for drug
identity yield false positives,1 28 but the percentage of false posi-
tives has not been quantified with any degree of precision. In this
case, little weight should be attached to this evidence; we know
that the technique is prone to error, but we have no objective
method of estimating the risk of error.
2. How reliable is the analyst's interpretive standard?
The reliability of the interpretive standard for evaluating this
type of forensic evidence is often the key to deciding the weight of
the evidence. As previously noted, the non-numerical nature of the
test result injects an inexorable element of subjectivity into the in-
terpretation of the test. The test's reliability determines the extent
to which the test is flawed by subjectivity.12 9 In the technical sense
of the term, "reliability" is the antithesis of subjectivity. If inde-
pendent analysts separated by thousands of miles can look at the
same visual display and draw the same inferences from the display,
the test's subjectivity is minimal; and the non-numerical character
of the test result should not deter us from attaching great weight
to the evidence.
The criterion of reliability distinguishes accepted techniques
such as fingerprint analysis from such maligned forensic tech-
niques as polygraphy. Fingerprint identification ranks high in reli-
ability. There exists a detailed system for the primary and secon-
dary classification of fingerprints, 130 and this classification system
helps the analyst isolate distinctive points of similarity between
two fingerprints. In the United States, there is no set number of
128. Shapiro, Laboratory Identification of Drugs, in TENTH ANNUAL CRIMINAL ADVOCACY
INSTITUTE 397 (1978); Shapiro, Criminal Defenses in Drug Cases, 2 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 131
(1976).
129. Abrams, supra note 116, at 791-99; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1201 n.20.
130. Menzel, The Development of Fingerprints, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 619,
648-52 (2d ed. E. Imwinkelried 1981).
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points of similarity required for an identification, 13 1 but ten points
is the standard most commonly preferred. 132 Hence, there is sub-
stantial consensus among fingerprint analysts on what constitutes
a distinctive point and how many points are needed for identifica-
tion. This consensus has made fingerprint identification a rela-
tively reliable technique, and fingerprint analysts rarely disa-
gree.' Equally competent fingerprint analysts working
independently in Virginia and Missouri should duplicate each
other's results and reach the same conclusion.
The likelihood of disagreement is much greater in the case of
polygraphy. As one experienced polygraphist has candidly con-
ceded, "The [polygraph] technique is not like fingerprints ...
where experts miles apart can come to the same conclusions in ex-
amining the same set of prints . . . .",8 Research data indicate
that polygraphists' interpretive standards are less reliable and
more subjective. Even the leading proponents of polygraph evi-
dence admit 3 5 that there have been fewer reliability studies of po-
lygraphy than validity studies. 36 They also concede that some of
the leading reliability studies show that in as many as fifteen per-
cent of the cases, polygraphists are likely to disagree over the in-
terpretation of the polygram. 37 Polygraph critics point to a recent
Ohio case as a perfect illustration of the unreliability of polygra-
phy."3 8 In that case, four of the leading polygraph experts in the
nation examined the polygrams and reached radically different
conclusions. 139
If a technique's interpretive standards have been experimentally
verified as being reliable, the expert's interpretation is entitled to
131. Id. at 654.
132. Id. at 652.
133. J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18.1 (1974) ("Scientific authority now
emphatically declares that fingerprints are reliable as a means of identification."); id. § 18.2
n.9 ("The fingerprints of an individual are personal to him, without duplication in the prints
of any other person.").
134. Laurendi, Opposition to the Admissibility of Lie Detector Tests in Criminal Cases,
in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVICENCE 805, 818 (2d ed. E. Imwinkelried 1981).
135. Abrams, supra note 116, at 755, argues for the wider admissibility of polygraph
evidence.
136. Id. at 798.
137. Id. at 798-99.
138. Lykken, The Lie Detector and the Law, CRIM. DEF., May-June 1981, at 19.
139. Id.
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great weight. If that expert witness is qualified, the probability is
that other competent experts would draw the same inferences.
However, if the technique produces a non-numerical result and
there is inadequate proof of the reliability of the interpretive stan-
dard, the expert's interpretation should be regarded with caution.
In this situation, we do not have the same assurance that other
qualified experts would concur with the witness on the stand.
When faced with the task of evaluating the weight of a scientific
technique that yields a non-numerical result, the opponent should
demand to know the extent to which the reliability of the tech-
nique's interpretive standards has been established.
C. The Third Category: "Software" Techniques
Our third category includes what we shall label "software." The
label is admittedly imprecise but at least suggests the common de-
nominator of the techniques falling in this category: No instrument
intervenes to produce a numerical result such as a digital BAC
readout or a visual display such as a polygram. "Software" includes
such forensic findings as a psychiatrist's diagnosis of mental illness
or a pathologist's characterization of a wound as homicidal. The
analyst directly observes the primary data and formulates an opin-
ion without resorting extensively to any intermediate instrument.
This is the sort of evidence least likely to awe the jury. When a
layperson thinks of science, the layperson naturally thinks of so-
phisticated instruments capable of precise management. Software
techniques are the farthest removed from the layperson's concep-
tion of science; and for that reason, in the minds of many layper-
son these techniques hardly deserve the august title, "scientific."
The element of subjectivity in these techniques is patent to any
juror. Yet that observation is small comfort to the attorney oppos-
ing software evidence; many types of software evidence are admis-
sible in the courtroom, 140 and the attorney will have great difficulty
evaluating the weight of software evidence. As we did with the
other two categories of forensic techniques, we shall identify the
questions the attorney should ask to determine that weight.
140. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 88, chs. 3 & 5. But see id. ch. 15.
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1. How reliable is the analyst's interpretive standard?
As in the case of techniques producing non-numerical visual dis-
plays, one of the critical questions is the reliability of the analyst's
interpretive standards. The psychiatric field highlights the impor-
tance of this question, for there has been much criticism of the
unreliability of psychiatric interpretive standards. Some of the
criticism has come from judicial circles. 4 ' Both Justice Burger142
and Judge Bazelon 143 have pointed to the embarassing frequency
with which psychiatrists disagree in the courtroom. This criticism
finds support in the psychiatric and psychological literature.'"
That literature contains numerous studies indicating that the po-
litical and social biases of the psychiatrist can greatly influence the
psychiatrist's evaluation. 145 In one recent research project, the psy-
chiatrists at a clinic were found to agree on specific diagnoses in
only twenty-one percent of the cases. 46 They disagreed in thirty-
one percent of the cases. 47 Given the state of the record, psychiat-
ric testimony should generally be accorded little weight. The relia-
bility of most psychiatric opinion is of a much lower caliber than
the proven reliability of, for example, fingerprint identification.
Yet we cannot generalize about all psychiatric evaluation. We
must focus on the precise technique the psychiatrist is using; and
if we do, we shall occasionally find that there are relatively objec-
tive standards for evaluating the outcome in some psychiatric tech-
niques. One frequently used personal assessment technique is the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).14s The test
consists of 566 statements which the subject marks true or false.
However, in interpreting the test results, the psychiatrist does not
simply make an intuitive, impressionistic judgment. There are
141. Ziskin, The Importance of Hard Data to Software Techniques, in SCIENTIFIC AND
EXPERT EVIDENCE 1097, 1100-02 (2d ed. E. Imwinkelried 1981).
142. Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers and the Courts, 28 FED. PROBATION 3, 7 (June 1964).
143. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
144. See the numerous articles cited in Ziskin, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. Shell, Psychiatric Testimony: Science or Fortune-Telling?, BARRISTER, Fall 1980, at
8.
147. Id.
148. Ziskin, supra note 141, at 1108-09.
[Vol. 23:261
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
scales for grading the test results.149 On the basis of the test an-
swers, the subject is compared with a normative population and
assigned a position on each scale.150 The positions on the scales
correspond roughly with various psychiatric diagnoses. 1 Numer-
ous studies have empirically established correlations between cer-
tain configurations of scale scores and particular psychiatric diag-
noses.1 52 These scales remove much of the subjectivity from this
psychiatric evaluation.
A concerted effort is being made to improve the reliability of in-
terpretive standards in psychiatry. The American Psychiatric As-
sociation recently released DSM III, the third edition of its Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. 3 The new
edition dramatically revises the symptomatology for some of the
leading psychiatric diagnoses. In the past, the DSM included vague
lists of symptoms without requiring particular symptoms or a spe-
cific number of symptoms to support a diagnosis. The vague provi-
sions in DSM understandably resulted in unpredictable and unreli-
able diagnoses.154 Several researchers were troubled by this
unreliability and worked to make the symptomatology more objec-
tive. The end product of their work was the development of the so-
called Feighner criteria,5 5 which have largely been incorporated in
DSM III. These criteria often dictate that a certain number of
listed symptoms must be present for a particular diagnosis. 56
These criteria promise to increase the reliability of diagnosing
these mental illnesses.157
When the witness cannot point to hard proof of the reliability of
his or her interpretive standard, the trier of fact should ascribe lit-
tle weight to the expert's interpretation. Unfortunately, that is
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL (3d ed.
1980).
154. Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, Clinical Criteria for Psychiatric Diagnosis and DSM-
III, 132 AM. J. PSYCH. 1187 (1975); Feighner et al., Diagnostic Criteria for Use in Psychiat-
ric Research, 26 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCH. 57 (1972).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, supra note 154.
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often the case in the psychiatric field. However, as we have seen,
rather than summarily dismissing all psychiatric evidence, the at-
torney should investigate to determine whether the particular eval-
uation the psychiatrist made is one of the exceptional determina-
tions governed by relatively objective criteria. In a surprisingly
large number of cases, the attorney will find that to be the case.
When the mental health professional employs interpretive stan-
dards of demonstrated reliability, the interpretation is entitled to
weight comparable to that accorded the most reliable evidence in
the second category.
2. Has the expert collected all the factual data necessary to
have a reliable basis for the opinion?
The softer the expert's interpretive standard, the more critical it
becomes to assess the hardness of the factual basis of the opin-
ion. 158 Especially in the field of forensic psychiatry, the expert's
evaluation must "be anchored in and tied to as much hard infor-
mation as possible.' 1 59 As one of the leading texts on law and psy-
chiatry emphasizes, the value and weight of a psychiatric evalua-
tion are vitally dependent on the extent to which the expert rests
the evaluation on concrete, historical data.6 0
Although the experts in a field may disagree on the interpretive
standard to apply to the underlying, hard data, they may agree on
the type of data needed to form any reliable opinion. The field of
forensic pathology is illustrative. Many of the determinations made
by the forensic pathologist are software findings in the same sense
as findings by a forensic psychiatrist.'"' Indeed, one well known
pathologist has described an autopsy as "an exercise in objective
observation and subjective interpretation.' ' 6 2 For example, when
the pathologist is asked to determine whether wounds on the ca-
daver were produced by a particular type of instrument or were
homicidal rather than suicidal, there are no mechanical formulae
158. Ziskin, supra note 141, at 1103-13.
159. Id. at 1103.
160. R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 69-73 (1968).
161. See A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 88, ch. 5.
162. Devlin, The Autopsy in Criminal Cases, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 1205
(2d ed. E. Imwinkelried 1981).
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the pathologist can use to make the determination.163 However, ex-
perienced practitioners would probably agree that the pathologist
must gather certain types of data before forming any opinion in
the case. For instance, many forensic pathologists would concur
that a microscopic tissue examination is necessary before forming
any interpretation of the wound pathology.16 4 Forming an opinion
without that hard, supporting data would be "extremely danger-
ous. 16 5 If the pathologist were sloppy or foolish, enough to frame
an opinion without gathering that data, the trier of fact should se-
verely discount the opinion.
In short, the attorney analyzing software evidence should con-
sider both the interpretive standard and the underlying data the
standard is applied to. The attorney will sometimes find that even
when experts disagree violently over the controlling interpretive
standard, they are in virtually unanimous agreement over the
types of hard data that are needed to have a trustworthy basis for
any opinion. If an expert rushes to an opinion before collecting all
the requisite data, the result should be the same as when the ex-
pert cannot demonstrate the reliability of the interpretive stan-
dard: The trier of fact should conclude that the expert's opinion
deserves little credence.
III. CONCLUSION
Before closing this article, two caveats are in order. One is that
the questions we have identified in Part II of this article are by no
means the only questions relevant to the admissibility and weight
of scientific evidence. The approach outlined in this article does
not purport to be an exhaustive list of all the relevant factors.
Many other factors, including the instrument's working condition,
the witness' expertise, and the use of proper test procedures, bear
upon the admissibility and weight of scientific evidence. ' How-
ever, those factors should be obvious even to attorneys with no sci-
entific background. We have attempted to highlight the subtler
163. Id.; A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 88, ch. 5.
164. Wecht, Forensic Pathology for Trial Lawyers, in SCINTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
1141, 1146 (2d ed. E. Imwinkelried 1981).
165. Id.
166. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 83, ch. 8.
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questions that are not as readily apparent.
The second caveat is that our three categories are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. For example, the results of some tests in the
second category could easily be converted into numerical terms.
Chemical color tests for drug identification fall into the second cat-
egory, but we could convert the visual display into numerical terms
by describing the resulting color in terms of wavelength and inten-
sity. 6 7 Similarly, the polygraph falls into the second category, but
we could measure the periodicity and amplitude of the patterns on
the polygram. 8 8 We have classified forensic techniques on the ba-
sis of the manner in which the analyst usually conducts and inter-
prets the test rather than on the basis of whether the test result
could possibly be couched in numerical terms.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the approach outlined should
prove useful to attorneys. In a pragmatic sense, the approach
works. Experience suggests that in the case of most forensic tech-
niques, this approach will help the attorney in identifying the key
questions determining the weight of the evidence. For example, we
placed neutron activation analysis (NAA) in the first category, in
which one of the central questions is whether there is an adequate
comparative data base. The most astute students of NAA have
commented that the sufficiency of the comparative data base is the
primary problem in modern NAA. 169 By the same token, we as-
signed polygraphy to the second category, in which one of the ma-
jor issues is the reliability of the interpretive standards. The most
perceptive students of polygraphy have identified that very issue
as the heart of the debate over polygraphy. 170 Our categorization is
far from perfect; but in many, if not most, instances, the categori-
zation will lead the attorney to ask the right questions about the
weight of the scientific evidence.
This approach is not simply an approach to attacking scientific
evidence. The approach is certainly useful from the perspective of
the opponent of the evidence; the approach should aid the oppo-
167. Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Interpreting Instrumental Test Results, in
SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE, 409, 425 (2d ed. E. Imwinkelried 1981).
168. Id.
169. Comment, The Evidentiary Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 CAL. L. REv.
997, 998 (1971).
170. Lykken, supra note 138, at 19.
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nent in identifying points of attack. However, more fundamentally,
this is an approach to evaluating the weight of scientific evidence.
If there are no imprecisions in the process an instrument uses to
yield a number and we do have an extensive comparative data
base, that evidence is entitled to great weight; and if the proponent
clearly explains the precision of the process and the extent of the
data base, the trier of fact will probably have the good sense to
accord the evidence that weight.
Although this approach will be helpful to attorneys, it would be
dishonest to suggest that this approach will make it easy for attor-
neys to evaluate the weight of scientific evidence. In the last era of
scientific evidence dominated by admissibility questions, attorneys
could be content to have a superficial understanding of forensic
science. In most cases, the outcome turned on the application of
Frye, and the attorneys litigated historical issues rather than prop-
erly scientific issues. But in the coming era, that will change. Sci-
entific evidence will be admitted more readily, the focus will shift
to the weight of the evidence, and attorneys, will need a much more
in-depth appreciation of forensic science to properly analyze the
weight of the evidence. Juries will be exposed to scientific evidence
more frequently; and in order to teach jurors the utility and limita-
tions of forensic science, attorneys themselves will have to become
more avid students of science.
This educational process is complicated by the fact that the pro-
cess is ongoing at several levels. Forensic scientists themselves are
devoting more energy to the problem of evaluating the weight of
scientific evidence. As one leading forensic scientist recently
pointed out, the 1970's witnessed the development of new technical
tools to conduct forensic work "but as yet we have failed to define
in statistical terms the meaning and significance of the data they
generate. ' 17 1 The challenge to the scientific community is to ex-
pand its comparative data bases and refine its interpretive stan-
dards.17 2 For their part, in this new era of scientific evidence attor-
neys must not only be familiar with the legal standards governing
171. Saferstein, Criminalistics-A Look Back at the 1970s, a Look Ahead at the 1980s,
24 J. FOR. Sci. 925, 930 (1979). "
172. Organizations such as the'Forensic Sciences Foundation and the Committee on Fo-
rensic Sciences of the American Society for Testing and Material are pursuing this
objective.
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the admissibility of scientific proof; attorneys must also familiarize
themselves with the data bases and interpretive standards that fa-
cilitate evaluating the weight of scientific evidence. Only a cooper-
ative, educational partnership between forensic experts and attor-
neys will ensure that the advent of this new era in scientific
evidence will have a salutary effect on our legal system.
